Observability, Processes, and Pseudoprocesses in Astronomy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35588/cc.v7d8356Keywords:
Scientific Practices, Observation, Simulation, Pseudoprocesses, AstronomyAbstract
This article examines current epistemological issues related to observational practices in contemporary astronomy. These practices are not limited to the detection and manipulation of physical processes and signals; rather, they are structured through sophisticated observational models that integrate observations and astrophysical simulations, instrumental environments and data models, inferential frameworks, and validation strategies. It will be argued that the notion of observability in this scientific discipline should be extended to the computational domain. This extension would enable certain modes of epistemic access, mediated by such models, in which phenomena become accessible through structural configurations that encode substantial causal information. By considering recent astronomical examples, it will be shown that these representations consist of patterns of relations among objects and observable astrophysical properties that arise from the interaction of multiple causal processes and that, without constituting autonomous processes, nonetheless contain relevant information about underlying dynamics. In this way, pseudoprocesses are not merely methodological auxiliaries, but elements with specific epistemic functions within observational models, allowing for their identification, stabilization, and validation. This conception broadens the classical concept of observability by incorporating additional dimensions of the observational situation, such as scale, perspective, and the observer’s point of view.
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