La fisonomía plural de la adecuación empírica en la física
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35588/cc.v6d7829Palabras clave:
Filosofía de la física, Adecuación empírica, Realismo científico, Problema de la medición, Problema del macro-objeto, Problema del tiempoResumen
En el ámbito de la filosofía de la física es posible identificar varios problemas fundacionales que, en su formulación, apelan de forma explícita al concepto de adecuación empírica. Aunque a primera vista pareciera que estos problemas comparten una misma caracterización canónica de este concepto, un análisis filosófico más profundo demuestra que la anatomía de este último depende de presupuestos respecto a lo que es observable o detectable, por lo que no se puede retratar bajo un mismo enfoque. En efecto, puesto que lo que cuenta como observable o detectable depende de la teoría y de la posición filosófica que se adopte respecto a ella, la propia definición de adecuación empírica no sólo involucra a dicha teoría sino también a la posición en cuestión. Bajo estas circunstancias, el objetivo de esta contribución es elaborar una caracterización plural de adecuación empírica que sea relativa al espectro de diferentes compromisos filosóficos asociados con el debate realismo-antirrealismo. Con base en esta caracterización, demostraré que algunos problemas fundacionales que se abordan en la filosofía de la física solo pueden formularse y tienen sentido bajo la lente de diferentes nociones particulares de adecuación empírica, alineadas al espectro de filosofías que emanan de dicho debate.
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2025-12-09Publicado
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Derechos de autor 2025 Jorge Manero
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.
