Explicación e inferencialismo
Una solución antirrealista para la paradoja de la explicación
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35588/cc.v5i1.6588Palabras clave:
paradoja de la explicación, inferencialismo, explicación, modelos económicos, paradojaResumen
En este trabajo se propone una posible solución antirrealista a la paradoja de la explicación. Esta propuesta está en línea con la posición instrumentalista de Reiss (2012b, 2013) pero va más allá: se propone una posición inferencialista normativa de la explicación.
En primer lugar, mostraré algunos aspectos fundamentales del inferencialismo en el contexto de la explicación, y luego, mostraré cómo una posición inferencialista respecto a paradoja de la explicación se reduce a aceptar las siguientes tres proposiciones: 1. los modelos son verdaderos en el sentido de explicaciones verdaderas, 2. los modelos explican y 3. sólo las explicaciones verdaderas explican. Esto expresa una solución a la paradoja en tanto es perfectamente posible aceptar cada una de las tres proposiciones.
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- 2024-12-27 (2)
- 2024-12-23 (1)
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Derechos de autor 2024 Felipe Núñez Michea
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.
