Delusions as Belief

a Philosophical Analysis

Authors

  • Guillermo Ruiz-Pérez Clinic for Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and Psychosomatic Medicine of the University Hospital of Rüdersdorf bei Berlin, from the Medical University of Brandenburg (MHB); Faculty of Philosophy, National University of Distance Education https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3753-0796

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.35588/cc.v3i2.5685

Keywords:

Psychopathology, Doxa, Life, Reality, Psychosis, Vitality

Abstract

Throughout the psychopathological tradition, even the pre-phenomenological one, there is the categorization of delusion as a belief. Jaspers assumed the aforementioned categorization and founded it phenomenologically-existentially, defining its character of conviction. The concept of belief has had a long journey in the history of thought, although the debate about the doxastic vision of delusion has recently intensified. By virtue of what has already been mentioned, in this article we present a conceptual analysis of belief, with the aim of identify the essential aspects that allow delusion to be defined according to it. In this way, some of the main incursions made into the concept —from periplatonic antiquity to José Ortega y Gasset— will be discussed, highlighting in each thinker the essential guidelines of his approach to belief. In turn, introducing the Spanish philosopher to the psychopathological debate will allow the inclusion in the discussion of two important aspects that we believe may be fruitful for the philosophical discussion on delusion: the difference between ideas and beliefs, and the vitality of the latter. Finally, we refer to the current pro- and anti-doxastic debate, emphasizing the need to consider the breadth of the concept of belief in its historical genealogy. Based on this, we would be able to approach the moderate doxastic vision that authors such as Lisa Bortolotti have defended.

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Published

2022-12-31

Issue

Section

Dossier Philosophy of Psychiatry

How to Cite

Delusions as Belief: a Philosophical Analysis. (2022). Culturas Científicas, 3(2), 78-108. https://doi.org/10.35588/cc.v3i2.5685