Desde el pluralismo integrativo hacia un modelo enactivo en psiquiatría
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35588/cc.v3i2.5705Palabras clave:
Ciencia cognitiva, Neuroreduccionismo, Modelo biopsicosocial, Enactivismo, EmergentismoResumen
La búsqueda de un pluralismo integrativo en filosofía de la ciencia presenta ecos fructíferos en discusiones contemporáneas de la filosofía de la psiquiatría, sobre todo en torno a la necesidad de un pluralismo que supere un reduccionismo neurobiológico y un eclecticismo biopsicosocial. Los trabajos de la filósofa Sandra Mitchell constituirán un punto de partida para visualizar la necesidad de un paradigma pluralista, al mismo tiempo que permitirán exponer la tesis de que es necesario un modelo que permita una integración real entre las diversas dimensiones relevantes en psiquiatría para así no caer implícitamente nuevamente en un pluralismo reduccionista. En esta línea, se analizarán críticamente las perspectivas que han surgido en psiquiatría a la hora de lograr un pluralismo integrativo. Finalmente se revisará el modelo enactivo en ciencia cognitiva y su aplicación en psiquiatría como un posible alternativa en búsqueda de una integración en psiquiatría que permita un pluralismo integrativo a nivel ontológico, permitiendo un camino medio entre una psiquiatría neurocéntrica y una ecléctica relativista.
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